| 1 | 0Blockchains Are Not Safe For Voting, Concludes NAP Report (nytimes.com) null/SLASHDOT/0102640864 70\r |
| 2 | i Thursday September 06, 2018 @11:30PM (BeauHD)\r |
| 3 | i from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept.\r |
| 4 | i\r |
| 5 | i The National Academies Press has released a 156-page report,\r |
| 6 | i called " [1]Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy\r |
| 7 | i ," concluding that blockchains are not safe for the U.S.\r |
| 8 | i election system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an\r |
| 9 | i immutable ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology\r |
| 10 | i does little to solve the fundamental security issues of\r |
| 11 | i elections, and indeed, blockchains introduce additional\r |
| 12 | i security vulnerabilities," the report [2]states . "In\r |
| 13 | i particular, if malware on a voter's device alters a vote\r |
| 14 | i before it ever reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the\r |
| 15 | i blockchain fails to provide the desired integrity, and the\r |
| 16 | i voter may never know of the alteration."\r |
| 17 | i \r |
| 18 | i The report goes on to say that "Blockchains do not provide the\r |
| 19 | i anonymity often ascribed to them." It continues: "In the\r |
| 20 | i particular context of elections, voters need to be authorized\r |
| 21 | i as eligible to vote and as not having cast more than one\r |
| 22 | i ballot in the particular election. Blockchains do not offer\r |
| 23 | i means for providing the necessary authorization. [...] If a\r |
| 24 | i blockchain is used, then cast ballots must be encrypted or\r |
| 25 | i otherwise anonymized to prevent coercion and vote-selling."\r |
| 26 | i The New York Times summarizes the findings:\r |
| 27 | i \r |
| 28 | i > The cautiously worded report [3]calls for conducting all\r |
| 29 | i federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by 2020 .\r |
| 30 | i Its other top recommendation would require nationwide use of a\r |
| 31 | i specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure votes\r |
| 32 | i have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a price\r |
| 33 | i tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's\r |
| 34 | i Brennan Center has estimated that replacing aging voting\r |
| 35 | i machines over the next few years could cost well over $1\r |
| 36 | i billion. The 156-page report [...] bemoans a rickety system\r |
| 37 | i compromised by insecure voting equipment and software whose\r |
| 38 | i vulnerabilities were exposed more than a decade ago and which\r |
| 39 | i are too often managed by officials with little training in\r |
| 40 | i cybersecurity.\r |
| 41 | i \r |
| 42 | i >\r |
| 43 | i \r |
| 44 | i > Among its specific recommendations was a mainstay of\r |
| 45 | i election reformers: All elections should use human-readable\r |
| 46 | i paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are intended to assure\r |
| 47 | i voters that their vote was recorded accurately. They also\r |
| 48 | i create a lasting record of "voter intent" that can be used for\r |
| 49 | i reliable recounts, which may not be possible in systems that\r |
| 50 | i record votes electronically. [...] The panel also calls for\r |
| 51 | i all states to adopt a type of post-election audit that employs\r |
| 52 | i statistical analysis of ballots prior to results\r |
| 53 | i certification. Such "risk-limiting" audits are designed to\r |
| 54 | i uncover miscounts and vote tampering. Currently only three\r |
| 55 | i states mandate them.\r |
| 56 | i \r |
| 57 | i \r |
| 58 | i \r |
| 59 | i [1] https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protec-\r |
| 60 | i ting-american-democracy\r |
| 61 | i \r |
| 62 | i [2] https://www.nap.edu/read/25120/chapter/7#103\r |
| 63 | i \r |
| 64 | i [3] https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/09/06/technology/ap-\r |
| 65 | i us-tec-election-security-reform-report.html\r |
| 66 | i\r |