X-Git-Url: http://git.nikiroo.be/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=test%2Fexpected%2FSLASHDOT%2F0102640864;fp=test%2Fexpected%2FSLASHDOT%2F0102640864;h=ef36c281938474edf303ae55c7e5821f721bdeef;hb=299a08f325f3de71e191b17b16a120d1714e3d7c;hp=0000000000000000000000000000000000000000;hpb=1aaa6ba3686a5a14f2957b6b8d02ffc0903f6832;p=gofetch.git diff --git a/test/expected/SLASHDOT/0102640864 b/test/expected/SLASHDOT/0102640864 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef36c28 --- /dev/null +++ b/test/expected/SLASHDOT/0102640864 @@ -0,0 +1,397 @@ + BLOCKCHAINS ARE NOT SAFE FOR VOTING, CONCLUDES NAP REPORT + (NYTIMES.COM) + + Thursday September 06, 2018 @11:30PM (BeauHD) + from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept. + + o News link: https://politics.slashdot.org/story/18/09/06/2137245/blockchains-are-not-safe-for-voting-concludes-nap-report + o Source link: https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/09/06/technology/ap-us-tec-election-security-reform-report.html + + + The National Academies Press has released a 156-page report, + called "Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy," + concluding that blockchains are not safe for the U.S. election + system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an + immutable ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology + does little to solve the fundamental security issues of + elections, and indeed, blockchains introduce additional + security vulnerabilities," the report states. "In particular, + if malware on a voter's device alters a vote before it ever + reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the blockchain fails + to provide the desired integrity, and the voter may never know + of the alteration." The report goes on to say that + "Blockchains do not provide the anonymity often ascribed to + them." It continues: "In the particular context of elections, + voters need to be authorized as eligible to vote and as not + having cast more than one ballot in the particular election. + Blockchains do not offer means for providing the necessary + authorization. [...] If a blockchain is used, then cast + ballots must be encrypted or otherwise anonymized to prevent + coercion and vote-selling." The New York Times summarizes the + findings: The cautiously worded report calls for conducting + all federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by + 2020. Its other top recommendation would require nationwide + use of a specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure + votes have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a + price tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's + Brennan Center has estimated that replacing aging voting + machines over the next few years could cost well over $1 + billion. The 156-page report [...] bemoans a rickety system + compromised by insecure voting equipment and software whose + vulnerabilities were exposed more than a decade ago and which + are too often managed by officials with little training in + cybersecurity. Among its specific recommendations was a + mainstay of election reformers: All elections should use + human-readable paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are + intended to assure voters that their vote was recorded + accurately. They also create a lasting record of "voter + intent" that can be used for reliable recounts, which may not + be possible in systems that record votes electronically. [...] + The panel also calls for all states to adopt a type of + post-election audit that employs statistical analysis of + ballots prior to results certification. Such "risk-limiting" + audits are designed to uncover miscounts and vote tampering. + Currently only three states mandate them. + + + ** + + ** Re:All security = an implementation. (Score:5, Insightful) + (by PopeRatzo ( 965947 )) + + + > To say blockchain is inherently unsafe is like saying + > software is inherently unsafe + Oh, you are so close to a breakthrough. + When it comes to voting, blockchain, like software, IS + inherently unsafe. If the main goal for voting security is + maintaining the people's confidence in an election, the only + system that will meet that standard is a system where people + are actually keeping an eye on one another. And I mean + physically watching one another. And that's the system we had + in place before the advent of voting machines and election + software. You had a room full of election judges from both + sides, and they sat side-by-side checking in voters as they + approached the voting booth and physically watched them put + the ballot in the box. When the votes were counted, there was + a whole bunch of people from both parties standing around + keeping a close eye. When the ballots were sent for storage, + one person from each party rode in the truck to drop them off + after sealing the container - together - and signing off. + It was trust, but verify. Was it possible to jigger with an + election like that? Of course. But you had a list of names of + people you could hold accountable at every step in the + process. Electronic voting will never, ever be trusted. That + is the effect of transparency. + + ** + + ** Re: (Score:1, Insightful) + (by Anonymous Coward) + + + > " If the main goal for voting security is maintaining + > the people's confidence in an election " - Well I don't + > agree with that starting point definition. I think + > security = security, not theater of. + Then you're bad at security. Security is theater. + There is no impregnable system. Security can only + increase the difficulty of entering a system, it cannot + stop a determined opponent. Is a CCTV system going to + stop someone from breaking into your store? No, but it + will make the person think twice about it, because they + are likely to be recorded, found, and caught. Is the + TSA likely to stop all bad guys from getting on planes? + No, but it alters how much they must prepare to get on + board the plane so hop + + ** Re: (Score:2) + (by Ocker3 ( 1232550 )) + + + Sadly, the TSA haven't shown themselves to be any + good at their job, repeatedly. It's hard to get good + help when the work is shite, the 'customers' range + from sullen to hating you, and the pay is peanuts. + + + + + ** Transparency is the key (Score:1) + (by victor_alarcon ( 5520418 )) + + + I thought that was the main selling point. Yes, I'm sure + someone can come up with some anonymity scheme but + transparency should be top priority. Apologies if the + point is too naive. + + + ** Re: (Score:1) + (by Anonymous Coward) + + + Paper votes aren't any better, just look at Russia's vote + stuffing. Literately. Someone comes up to the booth and + stuffs fake/coerced votes into the box. + Now the way most US, Canadian, and UK elections are run, + the paper vote is a two-step process. + A) You go to a scrutineer to check your name off a PAPER + list, they hand you a ballot with no identifying + information on it + B) You mark an X on the ballot, fold it in half or stick + it in a privacy envelope and then stick it in a cardboard + box with a hole on top. + Now + + ** Re: (Score:2) + (by PopeRatzo ( 965947 )) + + + > Paper votes aren't any better, just look at Russia's + > vote stuffing. Literately. Someone comes up to the + > booth and stuffs fake/coerced votes into the box. + That's right, because Russia doesn't have the same + safeguards built into their elections that we have. You + don't have election judges from both sides watching + every vote from the time it's cast to the time it's + counted to the time it's sent for storage. In the US, + there have to be two election judges on hand when + absentee ballots are opened. + People can sti + + + + ** Re: (Score:2) + (by Ocker3 ( 1232550 )) + + + I'd invite you to visit us in Australia, where we have the + Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), a non-partisan (not + bi-partisan) body of people who are collectively + considered the Platinum Standard of running elections + around the world. We actually send people to the USA to + train election staff. We don't have party reps in the + voting area until the polls close, then the parties can + send in scrutineers who check that the paper ballots are + being counted as per the regulations (when I did this I + actually not + + ** Re: (Score:2) + (by PopeRatzo ( 965947 )) + + + > I'd invite you to visit us in Australia, + I've spent a fair amount of time in Australia. Yes, + I've heard you guys do a good job with elections, but + I'm not coming back until you get rid of those spiders + that jump up and bite you on the eye. Oh, and drop + bears and yowgwai. I don't need that kind of stress, + thanks. + + + + + ** Re: (Score:2) + (by shellster_dude ( 1261444 )) + + + Blockchains are obviously a terrible solution to election + fraud. The only thing that prevents blockchain tampering is a + ton of neutral third party machines checking the transactions + (typically miners). We've already seen that this is a + non-trivial problem when there is plenty of incentive for + random people to fulfill that role (mining of crypto + currency). National elections have very little incentive for + people to invest thousands in hardware and electricity, and a + ton of incentive for nation states like + + + ** Oh the irony (Score:4, Insightful) + (by the_skywise ( 189793 )) + + + > All elections should use human-readable paper ballots by 2020. + > Such systems are intended to assure voters that their vote was + > recorded accurately. They also create a lasting record of "voter + > intent" that can be used for reliable recounts, + Now I agree with this and am happy to move back to paper ballots + - But the entire reason we moved away from paper ballots was + because of the 2000 elections where Florida used punch cards and + political officers kept trying to argue over "partial punches", + "dimpled chads" and "dangling chads" where they tried to + reassess what the voter's INTENT was. + And, of course, let's not forget magical disappearing and + appearing boxes of ballots. + Any system can be hacked but the electronic one is harder to + track hacking than the good ol' traditional methods with paper + ballots. + + ** Re: (Score:3) + (by Dare nMc ( 468959 )) + + + Their have been academic papers proposing electronic system + that would be safe, where you could verify that your vote was + counted (IE received at the server.) + In theory with open software, hardware, and multiple servers + (again all open source) we could have a very robust + electronic voting system. This would require a large project + likely done with universities, and it may even be similar to + some bitcoin concepts. + The technology side is very solvable, getting the project + started, past the politics, and accept + + + ** Key statement (Score:2, Insightful) + (by Anonymous Coward) + + + They key statement in the finding that most technology solutions + fail to solve is this: + "Such systems are intended to *assure* voters that their vote + was recorded accurately." + In the end, paper ballots may seem inefficient from a processing + perspective, but that inefficiency becomes inherently difficult + to tamper with and builds in systems for checks and recounts. + The argument here is that blockchain is vulnerable before the + data is stored in the blockchain, at the UI and the machine + level, and blockchain th + + ** Re: (Score:2) + (by presidenteloco ( 659168 )) + + + Blanket arguments against computer algorithms for secure + voting (or secure anything) are illogical, emotional, and + flawed. + People argue to the effect: Because many programs have been + found to have a security flaw in either A) the algorithm + mathematics and logical assumptions, or in B) the + implementation, therefore ALL programs must have some flaw in + A) or B) therefore there is no such thing is a secure + computer program. That is just bullshit. It's incorrect, + unsupported generalization from specific examples. + + ** Re: (Score:2) + (by presidenteloco ( 659168 )) + + + Ok, there's a stupid bug in slashdot apparently, not + including my less-than sign. + There. One bug. + What's up with that. Let me try again. Hmm. There was a + less-than in there just to the left of this sentence. + That's lame on slashdot software's part. + So you proved that ALL programs have bugs? + Didn't think so. + + + + ** Paper ballots are by far the most secure solution (Score:4, + Insightful) + (by Seven Spirals ( 4924941 )) + + + Gimme a break. Use paper. Computers will be better tools for + tabulating and processing the votes after they are cast, but + it's tough to beat paper for a recount. Even paper has it's + flaws, but the hand waving crypto-bullshit is pathetic "Oh but + this counter signature will detect if the previous + initialization vector was properly zeroed inside of the S-Box" + *rolls eyes*. KISS baby. Things don't get more secure by making + them more complex and I can't think of any way to make something + more complex than to introduce computers. Computers are great at + some things, ideal for some tasks: not for voting. They suck at + that. + + ** paper ballots (Score:1) + (by Anonymous Coward) + + + The only way you can have some measure of accountability while + keeping votes anonymous. + + ** Or, for heaven's sake, you can just use paper (Score:3) + (by mark-t ( 151149 )) + + + Make a simple mark on a paper ballot indicating your vote, fold + it, put it in a box. + done + Now theoretically you could bribe people who do the counting, + but you'd have to bribe a *LOT* of people to make any kind of + difference because each individual ballot box with the folded + ballots contains but a tiny fraction of the number of votes, and + nobody ever counts the ballots from more than one or sometimes + two different boxes. + + ** the real story (Score:2) + (by slashmydots ( 2189826 )) + + + Blockchains are perfect, right? WRONG. And also right. They are + mathmatically flawless BUT if you outprocess the rest of the + network, you can finalize a block with whatever the hell you + want in it. You can form a block that says you own all bitcoins, + all transactions put them in your wallet, and you're also the + queen of England. The reason this "51% attack" doesn't happen it + because that amount of processing power doesn't exist. That many + ASICs don't exist on Earth. But let's set up a separate + blockchain an + + ** Re: (Score:2) + (by Kaenneth ( 82978 )) + + + Even with a 51% attack, the Bitcoin blockchain is filled with + digital signatures; noone but your own nodes would accept the + blocks, and you would only be 'fooling' yourself. + Electronic voting could only work if every citizen had their + own private, secure, digital signature key. Which can't + happen in the US because poor people can't afford them, and a + certain party would never give anything for free, while the + other would protect the poor. + + + ** + + ** Re: (Score:2) + (by jwymanm ( 627857 )) + + + This was the dumbest comment in the article. Obviously + software methods exist to verify after the fact that what you + saved is what you expected. + + + ** It's not how the vote was recorded... (Score:2) + (by LynnwoodRooster ( 966895 )) + + + > The report goes on to say that "Blockchains do not provide the + > anonymity often ascribed to them." It continues: "In the + > particular context of elections, voters need to be authorized as + > eligible to vote and as not having cast more than one ballot in + > the particular election. + It's who casts the vote. Before we even worry about Blockchain, + we need to ensure people casting the ballots are legally + eligible to vote. Guaranteeing a vote was cast is no more + important than guaranteeing who cast the vote was eligible to + actually cast that vote. + + ** Paper ballots (Score:2) + (by burtosis ( 1124179 )) + + + Let me start out saying 100% electronic voting is going to be a + disaster, triply so when done remotely and not at a secure + voting machine. But what most people don't realize is we + currently use unencrypted images of paper ballots in many states + as backups. These are very insecure. Why not use paper ballots + for the primary method, blockchain for the electronic backups? + This ultimately seems far more secure than what we are doing + now. We also could use open source machines and have audits at + each polling + +