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+0Blockchains Are Not Safe For Voting, Concludes NAP Report (nytimes.com)	null/SLASHDOT/0102640864		70
+i  Thursday September 06, 2018 @11:30PM (BeauHD)
+i  from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept.
+i
+i    The  National  Academies  Press has released a 156-page report,
+i    called  "Securing  the  Vote:  Protecting  American Democracy,"
+i    concluding  that blockchains are not safe for the U.S. election
+i    system.   "While  the  notion  of  using  a  blockchain  as  an
+i    immutable  ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology
+i    does  little  to  solve  the  fundamental  security  issues  of
+i    elections,   and   indeed,   blockchains  introduce  additional
+i    security  vulnerabilities,"  the report states. "In particular,
+i    if  malware  on  a  voter's device alters a vote before it ever
+i    reaches  a blockchain, the immutability of the blockchain fails
+i    to  provide the desired integrity, and the voter may never know
+i    of   the   alteration."   The   report  goes  on  to  say  that
+i    "Blockchains  do  not  provide  the anonymity often ascribed to
+i    them."  It  continues: "In the particular context of elections,
+i    voters  need  to  be  authorized as eligible to vote and as not
+i    having  cast  more  than one ballot in the particular election.
+i    Blockchains  do  not  offer  means  for providing the necessary
+i    authorization.  [...]  If  a  blockchain  is  used,  then  cast
+i    ballots  must  be  encrypted or otherwise anonymized to prevent
+i    coercion  and  vote-selling." The New York Times summarizes the
+i    findings:  The  cautiously  worded  report calls for conducting
+i    all  federal,  state  and  local  elections on paper ballots by
+i    2020.  Its  other  top  recommendation would require nationwide
+i    use  of a specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure
+i    votes  have  been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a
+i    price  tag  for its recommended overhaul. New York University's
+i    Brennan  Center  has  estimated  that  replacing  aging  voting
+i    machines  over  the  next  few  years  could  cost well over $1
+i    billion.  The  156-page  report  [...] bemoans a rickety system
+i    compromised  by  insecure  voting  equipment and software whose
+i    vulnerabilities  were  exposed more than a decade ago and which
+i    are  too  often  managed  by  officials with little training in
+i    cybersecurity.   Among   its  specific  recommendations  was  a
+i    mainstay  of  election  reformers:  All  elections  should  use
+i    human-readable   paper   ballots  by  2020.  Such  systems  are
+i    intended   to  assure  voters  that  their  vote  was  recorded
+i    accurately.  They  also  create  a  lasting  record  of  "voter
+i    intent"  that  can be used for reliable recounts, which may not
+i    be  possible in systems that record votes electronically. [...]
+i    The  panel  also  calls  for  all  states  to  adopt  a type of
+i    post-election   audit  that  employs  statistical  analysis  of
+i    ballots  prior  to  results certification. Such "risk-limiting"
+i    audits  are  designed  to uncover miscounts and vote tampering.
+i    Currently only three states mandate them.
+i