0Blockchains Are Not Safe For Voting, Concludes NAP Report (nytimes.com) null/SLASHDOT/0102640864 70 i Thursday September 06, 2018 @11:30PM (BeauHD) i from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept. i i The National Academies Press has released a 156-page report, i called " [1]Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy i ," concluding that blockchains are not safe for the U.S. i election system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an i immutable ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology i does little to solve the fundamental security issues of i elections, and indeed, blockchains introduce additional i security vulnerabilities," the report [2]states . "In i particular, if malware on a voter's device alters a vote i before it ever reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the i blockchain fails to provide the desired integrity, and the i voter may never know of the alteration." i i The report goes on to say that "Blockchains do not provide the i anonymity often ascribed to them." It continues: "In the i particular context of elections, voters need to be authorized i as eligible to vote and as not having cast more than one i ballot in the particular election. Blockchains do not offer i means for providing the necessary authorization. [...] If a i blockchain is used, then cast ballots must be encrypted or i otherwise anonymized to prevent coercion and vote-selling." i The New York Times summarizes the findings: i i > The cautiously worded report [3]calls for conducting all i federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by 2020 . i Its other top recommendation would require nationwide use of a i specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure votes i have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a price i tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's i Brennan Center has estimated that replacing aging voting i machines over the next few years could cost well over $1 i billion. The 156-page report [...] bemoans a rickety system i compromised by insecure voting equipment and software whose i vulnerabilities were exposed more than a decade ago and which i are too often managed by officials with little training in i cybersecurity. i i > i i > Among its specific recommendations was a mainstay of i election reformers: All elections should use human-readable i paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are intended to assure i voters that their vote was recorded accurately. They also i create a lasting record of "voter intent" that can be used for i reliable recounts, which may not be possible in systems that i record votes electronically. [...] The panel also calls for i all states to adopt a type of post-election audit that employs i statistical analysis of ballots prior to results i certification. Such "risk-limiting" audits are designed to i uncover miscounts and vote tampering. Currently only three i states mandate them. i i i i [1] https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protec- i ting-american-democracy i i [2] https://www.nap.edu/read/25120/chapter/7#103 i i [3] https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/09/06/technology/ap- i us-tec-election-security-reform-report.html i