Blockchains Are Not Safe For Voting, Concludes NAP Report (nytimes.com) 52
The National Academies Press has released a 156-page report, called "Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy," concluding that blockchains are not safe for the U.S. election system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an immutable ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology does little to solve the fundamental security issues of elections, and indeed, blockchains introduce additional security vulnerabilities," the report states. "In particular, if malware on a voter's device alters a vote before it ever reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the blockchain fails to provide the desired integrity, and the voter may never know of the alteration."
The report goes on to say that "Blockchains do not provide the anonymity often ascribed to them." It continues: "In the particular context of elections, voters need to be authorized as eligible to vote and as not having cast more than one ballot in the particular election. Blockchains do not offer means for providing the necessary authorization. [...] If a blockchain is used, then cast ballots must be encrypted or otherwise anonymized to prevent coercion and vote-selling." The New York Times summarizes the findings: The cautiously worded report calls for conducting all federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by 2020. Its other top recommendation would require nationwide use of a specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure votes have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a price tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's Brennan Center has estimated that replacing aging voting machines over the next few years could cost well over $1 billion. The 156-page report [...] bemoans a rickety system compromised by insecure voting equipment and software whose vulnerabilities were exposed more than a decade ago and which are too often managed by officials with little training in cybersecurity.
Among its specific recommendations was a mainstay of election reformers: All elections should use human-readable paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are intended to assure voters that their vote was recorded accurately. They also create a lasting record of "voter intent" that can be used for reliable recounts, which may not be possible in systems that record votes electronically. [...] The panel also calls for all states to adopt a type of post-election audit that employs statistical analysis of ballots prior to results certification. Such "risk-limiting" audits are designed to uncover miscounts and vote tampering. Currently only three states mandate them.
The report goes on to say that "Blockchains do not provide the anonymity often ascribed to them." It continues: "In the particular context of elections, voters need to be authorized as eligible to vote and as not having cast more than one ballot in the particular election. Blockchains do not offer means for providing the necessary authorization. [...] If a blockchain is used, then cast ballots must be encrypted or otherwise anonymized to prevent coercion and vote-selling." The New York Times summarizes the findings: The cautiously worded report calls for conducting all federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by 2020. Its other top recommendation would require nationwide use of a specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure votes have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a price tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's Brennan Center has estimated that replacing aging voting machines over the next few years could cost well over $1 billion. The 156-page report [...] bemoans a rickety system compromised by insecure voting equipment and software whose vulnerabilities were exposed more than a decade ago and which are too often managed by officials with little training in cybersecurity.
Among its specific recommendations was a mainstay of election reformers: All elections should use human-readable paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are intended to assure voters that their vote was recorded accurately. They also create a lasting record of "voter intent" that can be used for reliable recounts, which may not be possible in systems that record votes electronically. [...] The panel also calls for all states to adopt a type of post-election audit that employs statistical analysis of ballots prior to results certification. Such "risk-limiting" audits are designed to uncover miscounts and vote tampering. Currently only three states mandate them.
Re:All security = an implementation. (Score:5, Insightful)
Oh, you are so close to a breakthrough.
When it comes to voting, blockchain, like software, IS inherently unsafe. If the main goal for voting security is maintaining the people's confidence in an election, the only system that will meet that standard is a system where people are actually keeping an eye on one another. And I mean physically watching one another. And that's the system we had in place before the advent of voting machines and election software. You had a room full of election judges from both sides, and they sat side-by-side checking in voters as they approached the voting booth and physically watched them put the ballot in the box. When the votes were counted, there was a whole bunch of people from both parties standing around keeping a close eye. When the ballots were sent for storage, one person from each party rode in the truck to drop them off after sealing the container - together - and signing off.
It was trust, but verify. Was it possible to jigger with an election like that? Of course. But you had a list of names of people you could hold accountable at every step in the process. Electronic voting will never, ever be trusted. That is the effect of transparency.
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" If the main goal for voting security is maintaining the people's confidence in an election " - Well I don't agree with that starting point definition. I think security = security, not theater of.
Then you're bad at security. Security is theater.
There is no impregnable system. Security can only increase the difficulty of entering a system, it cannot stop a determined opponent. Is a CCTV system going to stop someone from breaking into your store? No, but it will make the person think twice about it, because they are likely to be recorded, found, and caught. Is the TSA likely to stop all bad guys from getting on planes? No, but it alters how much they must prepare to get on board the plane so hop
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Transparency is the key (Score:1)
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Paper votes aren't any better, just look at Russia's vote stuffing. Literately. Someone comes up to the booth and stuffs fake/coerced votes into the box.
Now the way most US, Canadian, and UK elections are run, the paper vote is a two-step process.
A) You go to a scrutineer to check your name off a PAPER list, they hand you a ballot with no identifying information on it
B) You mark an X on the ballot, fold it in half or stick it in a privacy envelope and then stick it in a cardboard box with a hole on top.
Now
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That's right, because Russia doesn't have the same safeguards built into their elections that we have. You don't have election judges from both sides watching every vote from the time it's cast to the time it's counted to the time it's sent for storage. In the US, there have to be two election judges on hand when absentee ballots are opened.
People can sti
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I've spent a fair amount of time in Australia. Yes, I've heard you guys do a good job with elections, but I'm not coming back until you get rid of those spiders that jump up and bite you on the eye. Oh, and drop bears and yowgwai. I don't need that kind of stress, thanks.
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Oh the irony (Score:4, Insightful)
All elections should use human-readable paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are intended to assure voters that their vote was recorded accurately. They also create a lasting record of "voter intent" that can be used for reliable recounts,
Now I agree with this and am happy to move back to paper ballots - But the entire reason we moved away from paper ballots was because of the 2000 elections where Florida used punch cards and political officers kept trying to argue over "partial punches", "dimpled chads" and "dangling chads" where they tried to reassess what the voter's INTENT was.
And, of course, let's not forget magical disappearing and appearing boxes of ballots.
Any system can be hacked but the electronic one is harder to track hacking than the good ol' traditional methods with paper ballots.
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Their have been academic papers proposing electronic system that would be safe, where you could verify that your vote was counted (IE received at the server.)
In theory with open software, hardware, and multiple servers (again all open source) we could have a very robust electronic voting system. This would require a large project likely done with universities, and it may even be similar to some bitcoin concepts.
The technology side is very solvable, getting the project started, past the politics, and accept
Key statement (Score:2, Insightful)
They key statement in the finding that most technology solutions fail to solve is this:
"Such systems are intended to *assure* voters that their vote was recorded accurately."
In the end, paper ballots may seem inefficient from a processing perspective, but that inefficiency becomes inherently difficult to tamper with and builds in systems for checks and recounts. The argument here is that blockchain is vulnerable before the data is stored in the blockchain, at the UI and the machine level, and blockchain th
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Blanket arguments against computer algorithms for secure voting (or secure anything) are illogical, emotional, and flawed.
People argue to the effect: Because many programs have been found to have a security flaw in either A) the algorithm mathematics and logical assumptions, or in B) the implementation, therefore ALL programs must have some flaw in A) or B) therefore there is no such thing is a secure computer program. That is just bullshit. It's incorrect, unsupported generalization from specific examples.
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Ok, there's a stupid bug in slashdot apparently, not including my less-than sign.
There. One bug.
What's up with that. Let me try again. Hmm. There was a less-than in there just to the left of this sentence. That's lame on slashdot software's part.
So you proved that ALL programs have bugs?
Didn't think so.
Paper ballots are by far the most secure solution (Score:4, Insightful)
paper ballots (Score:1)
The only way you can have some measure of accountability while keeping votes anonymous.
Or, for heaven's sake, you can just use paper (Score:3)
Make a simple mark on a paper ballot indicating your vote, fold it, put it in a box.
done
Now theoretically you could bribe people who do the counting, but you'd have to bribe a *LOT* of people to make any kind of difference because each individual ballot box with the folded ballots contains but a tiny fraction of the number of votes, and nobody ever counts the ballots from more than one or sometimes two different boxes.
the real story (Score:2)
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Even with a 51% attack, the Bitcoin blockchain is filled with digital signatures; noone but your own nodes would accept the blocks, and you would only be 'fooling' yourself.
Electronic voting could only work if every citizen had their own private, secure, digital signature key. Which can't happen in the US because poor people can't afford them, and a certain party would never give anything for free, while the other would protect the poor.
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It's not how the vote was recorded... (Score:2)
The report goes on to say that "Blockchains do not provide the anonymity often ascribed to them." It continues: "In the particular context of elections, voters need to be authorized as eligible to vote and as not having cast more than one ballot in the particular election.
It's who casts the vote. Before we even worry about Blockchain, we need to ensure people casting the ballots are legally eligible to vote. Guaranteeing a vote was cast is no more important than guaranteeing who cast the vote was eligible to actually cast that vote.
Paper ballots (Score:2)