X-Git-Url: http://git.nikiroo.be/?p=gofetch.git;a=blobdiff_plain;f=test%2Fexpected%2FSLASHDOT%2F0102640864.header;fp=test%2Fexpected%2FSLASHDOT%2F0102640864.header;h=33b8cb5e6a44ee2bdc450994f52eabb90e464175;hp=5ff23763a5a44c20dbd6a2c1315826f249f78c08;hb=3367f6256b5143b7cba2a61de36e74f389a5f379;hpb=b389651b0012a7ba1ff30d164958e155688ac216 diff --git a/test/expected/SLASHDOT/0102640864.header b/test/expected/SLASHDOT/0102640864.header index 5ff2376..33b8cb5 100644 --- a/test/expected/SLASHDOT/0102640864.header +++ b/test/expected/SLASHDOT/0102640864.header @@ -3,47 +3,64 @@ i Thursday September 06, 2018 @11:30PM (BeauHD) i from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept. i i The National Academies Press has released a 156-page report, -i called "Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy," -i concluding that blockchains are not safe for the U.S. election -i system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an +i called " [1]Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy +i ," concluding that blockchains are not safe for the U.S. +i election system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an i immutable ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology i does little to solve the fundamental security issues of i elections, and indeed, blockchains introduce additional -i security vulnerabilities," the report states. "In particular, -i if malware on a voter's device alters a vote before it ever -i reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the blockchain fails -i to provide the desired integrity, and the voter may never know -i of the alteration." The report goes on to say that -i "Blockchains do not provide the anonymity often ascribed to -i them." It continues: "In the particular context of elections, -i voters need to be authorized as eligible to vote and as not -i having cast more than one ballot in the particular election. -i Blockchains do not offer means for providing the necessary -i authorization. [...] If a blockchain is used, then cast -i ballots must be encrypted or otherwise anonymized to prevent -i coercion and vote-selling." The New York Times summarizes the -i findings: The cautiously worded report calls for conducting -i all federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by -i 2020. Its other top recommendation would require nationwide -i use of a specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure -i votes have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a -i price tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's +i security vulnerabilities," the report [2]states . "In +i particular, if malware on a voter's device alters a vote +i before it ever reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the +i blockchain fails to provide the desired integrity, and the +i voter may never know of the alteration." +i +i The report goes on to say that "Blockchains do not provide the +i anonymity often ascribed to them." It continues: "In the +i particular context of elections, voters need to be authorized +i as eligible to vote and as not having cast more than one +i ballot in the particular election. Blockchains do not offer +i means for providing the necessary authorization. [...] If a +i blockchain is used, then cast ballots must be encrypted or +i otherwise anonymized to prevent coercion and vote-selling." +i The New York Times summarizes the findings: +i +i > The cautiously worded report [3]calls for conducting all +i federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by 2020 . +i Its other top recommendation would require nationwide use of a +i specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure votes +i have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a price +i tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's i Brennan Center has estimated that replacing aging voting i machines over the next few years could cost well over $1 i billion. The 156-page report [...] bemoans a rickety system i compromised by insecure voting equipment and software whose i vulnerabilities were exposed more than a decade ago and which i are too often managed by officials with little training in -i cybersecurity. Among its specific recommendations was a -i mainstay of election reformers: All elections should use -i human-readable paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are -i intended to assure voters that their vote was recorded -i accurately. They also create a lasting record of "voter -i intent" that can be used for reliable recounts, which may not -i be possible in systems that record votes electronically. [...] -i The panel also calls for all states to adopt a type of -i post-election audit that employs statistical analysis of -i ballots prior to results certification. Such "risk-limiting" -i audits are designed to uncover miscounts and vote tampering. -i Currently only three states mandate them. +i cybersecurity. +i +i > +i +i > Among its specific recommendations was a mainstay of +i election reformers: All elections should use human-readable +i paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are intended to assure +i voters that their vote was recorded accurately. They also +i create a lasting record of "voter intent" that can be used for +i reliable recounts, which may not be possible in systems that +i record votes electronically. [...] The panel also calls for +i all states to adopt a type of post-election audit that employs +i statistical analysis of ballots prior to results +i certification. Such "risk-limiting" audits are designed to +i uncover miscounts and vote tampering. Currently only three +i states mandate them. +i +i +i +i [1] https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protec- +i ting-american-democracy +i +i [2] https://www.nap.edu/read/25120/chapter/7#103 +i +i [3] https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/09/06/technology/ap- +i us-tec-election-security-reform-report.html i