test/expected/SLASHDOT/0102640864.header

   1 0Blockchains Are Not Safe For Voting, Concludes NAP Report (nytimes.com)        null/SLASHDOT/0102640864                70
   2 i  Thursday September 06, 2018 @11:30PM (BeauHD)
   3 i  from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept.
   4 i
   5 i    The  National  Academies  Press has released a 156-page report,
   6 i    called  "  [1]Securing  the Vote: Protecting American Democracy
   7 i    ,"  concluding  that  blockchains  are  not  safe  for the U.S.
   8 i    election  system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an
   9 i    immutable  ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology
  10 i    does  little  to  solve  the  fundamental  security  issues  of
  11 i    elections,   and   indeed,   blockchains  introduce  additional
  12 i    security   vulnerabilities,"   the   report   [2]states  .  "In
  13 i    particular,  if  malware  on  a  voter's  device  alters a vote
  14 i    before  it  ever  reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the
  15 i    blockchain  fails  to  provide  the  desired integrity, and the
  16 i    voter may never know of the alteration."
  17 i
  18 i    The  report goes on to say that "Blockchains do not provide the
  19 i    anonymity  often  ascribed  to  them."  It  continues:  "In the
  20 i    particular  context  of elections, voters need to be authorized
  21 i    as  eligible  to  vote  and  as  not  having cast more than one
  22 i    ballot  in  the  particular  election. Blockchains do not offer
  23 i    means  for  providing  the  necessary authorization. [...] If a
  24 i    blockchain  is  used,  then  cast  ballots must be encrypted or
  25 i    otherwise  anonymized  to  prevent  coercion and vote-selling."
  26 i    The New York Times summarizes the findings:
  27 i
  28 i    >  The  cautiously  worded  report  [3]calls for conducting all
  29 i    federal,  state  and local elections on paper ballots by 2020 .
  30 i    Its  other top recommendation would require nationwide use of a
  31 i    specific  form  of  routine  postelection audit to ensure votes
  32 i    have  been  accurately counted. The panel did not offer a price
  33 i    tag   for  its  recommended  overhaul.  New  York  University's
  34 i    Brennan  Center  has  estimated  that  replacing  aging  voting
  35 i    machines  over  the  next  few  years  could  cost well over $1
  36 i    billion.  The  156-page  report  [...] bemoans a rickety system
  37 i    compromised  by  insecure  voting  equipment and software whose
  38 i    vulnerabilities  were  exposed more than a decade ago and which
  39 i    are  too  often  managed  by  officials with little training in
  40 i    cybersecurity.
  41 i
  42 i    >
  43 i
  44 i    >   Among  its  specific  recommendations  was  a  mainstay  of
  45 i    election  reformers:  All  elections  should use human-readable
  46 i    paper  ballots  by  2020.  Such  systems are intended to assure
  47 i    voters  that  their  vote  was  recorded  accurately. They also
  48 i    create  a lasting record of "voter intent" that can be used for
  49 i    reliable  recounts,  which  may not be possible in systems that
  50 i    record  votes  electronically.  [...]  The panel also calls for
  51 i    all  states to adopt a type of post-election audit that employs
  52 i    statistical    analysis    of    ballots   prior   to   results
  53 i    certification.  Such  "risk-limiting"  audits  are  designed to
  54 i    uncover  miscounts  and  vote  tampering.  Currently only three
  55 i    states mandate them.
  56 i
  57 i
  58 i
  59 i    [1] https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protec-
  60 i    ting-american-democracy
  61 i
  62 i    [2] https://www.nap.edu/read/25120/chapter/7#103
  63 i
  64 i    [3]  https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/09/06/technology/ap-
  65 i    us-tec-election-security-reform-report.html
  66 i