git://git.nikiroo.be / gofetch.git / blame
| Commit | Line | Data |
|---|---|---|
| 299a08f3 NR |
1 | 0Blockchains Are Not Safe For Voting, Concludes NAP Report (nytimes.com) null/SLASHDOT/0102640864 70\r |
| 2 | i Thursday September 06, 2018 @11:30PM (BeauHD)\r | |
| 3 | i from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept.\r | |
| 4 | i\r | |
| 5 | i The National Academies Press has released a 156-page report,\r | |
| 6 | i called "Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy,"\r | |
| 7 | i concluding that blockchains are not safe for the U.S. election\r | |
| 8 | i system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an\r | |
| 9 | i immutable ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology\r | |
| 10 | i does little to solve the fundamental security issues of\r | |
| 11 | i elections, and indeed, blockchains introduce additional\r | |
| 12 | i security vulnerabilities," the report states. "In particular,\r | |
| 13 | i if malware on a voter's device alters a vote before it ever\r | |
| 14 | i reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the blockchain fails\r | |
| 15 | i to provide the desired integrity, and the voter may never know\r | |
| 16 | i of the alteration." The report goes on to say that\r | |
| 17 | i "Blockchains do not provide the anonymity often ascribed to\r | |
| 18 | i them." It continues: "In the particular context of elections,\r | |
| 19 | i voters need to be authorized as eligible to vote and as not\r | |
| 20 | i having cast more than one ballot in the particular election.\r | |
| 21 | i Blockchains do not offer means for providing the necessary\r | |
| 22 | i authorization. [...] If a blockchain is used, then cast\r | |
| 23 | i ballots must be encrypted or otherwise anonymized to prevent\r | |
| 24 | i coercion and vote-selling." The New York Times summarizes the\r | |
| 25 | i findings: The cautiously worded report calls for conducting\r | |
| 26 | i all federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by\r | |
| 27 | i 2020. Its other top recommendation would require nationwide\r | |
| 28 | i use of a specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure\r | |
| 29 | i votes have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a\r | |
| 30 | i price tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's\r | |
| 31 | i Brennan Center has estimated that replacing aging voting\r | |
| 32 | i machines over the next few years could cost well over $1\r | |
| 33 | i billion. The 156-page report [...] bemoans a rickety system\r | |
| 34 | i compromised by insecure voting equipment and software whose\r | |
| 35 | i vulnerabilities were exposed more than a decade ago and which\r | |
| 36 | i are too often managed by officials with little training in\r | |
| 37 | i cybersecurity. Among its specific recommendations was a\r | |
| 38 | i mainstay of election reformers: All elections should use\r | |
| 39 | i human-readable paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are\r | |
| 40 | i intended to assure voters that their vote was recorded\r | |
| 41 | i accurately. They also create a lasting record of "voter\r | |
| 42 | i intent" that can be used for reliable recounts, which may not\r | |
| 43 | i be possible in systems that record votes electronically. [...]\r | |
| 44 | i The panel also calls for all states to adopt a type of\r | |
| 45 | i post-election audit that employs statistical analysis of\r | |
| 46 | i ballots prior to results certification. Such "risk-limiting"\r | |
| 47 | i audits are designed to uncover miscounts and vote tampering.\r | |
| 48 | i Currently only three states mandate them.\r | |
| 49 | i\r |