i from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept.\r
i\r
i The National Academies Press has released a 156-page report,\r
-i called "Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy,"\r
-i concluding that blockchains are not safe for the U.S. election\r
-i system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an\r
+i called " [1]Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy\r
+i ," concluding that blockchains are not safe for the U.S.\r
+i election system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an\r
i immutable ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology\r
i does little to solve the fundamental security issues of\r
i elections, and indeed, blockchains introduce additional\r
-i security vulnerabilities," the report states. "In particular,\r
-i if malware on a voter's device alters a vote before it ever\r
-i reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the blockchain fails\r
-i to provide the desired integrity, and the voter may never know\r
-i of the alteration." The report goes on to say that\r
-i "Blockchains do not provide the anonymity often ascribed to\r
-i them." It continues: "In the particular context of elections,\r
-i voters need to be authorized as eligible to vote and as not\r
-i having cast more than one ballot in the particular election.\r
-i Blockchains do not offer means for providing the necessary\r
-i authorization. [...] If a blockchain is used, then cast\r
-i ballots must be encrypted or otherwise anonymized to prevent\r
-i coercion and vote-selling." The New York Times summarizes the\r
-i findings: The cautiously worded report calls for conducting\r
-i all federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by\r
-i 2020. Its other top recommendation would require nationwide\r
-i use of a specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure\r
-i votes have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a\r
-i price tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's\r
+i security vulnerabilities," the report [2]states . "In\r
+i particular, if malware on a voter's device alters a vote\r
+i before it ever reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the\r
+i blockchain fails to provide the desired integrity, and the\r
+i voter may never know of the alteration."\r
+i \r
+i The report goes on to say that "Blockchains do not provide the\r
+i anonymity often ascribed to them." It continues: "In the\r
+i particular context of elections, voters need to be authorized\r
+i as eligible to vote and as not having cast more than one\r
+i ballot in the particular election. Blockchains do not offer\r
+i means for providing the necessary authorization. [...] If a\r
+i blockchain is used, then cast ballots must be encrypted or\r
+i otherwise anonymized to prevent coercion and vote-selling."\r
+i The New York Times summarizes the findings:\r
+i \r
+i > The cautiously worded report [3]calls for conducting all\r
+i federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by 2020 .\r
+i Its other top recommendation would require nationwide use of a\r
+i specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure votes\r
+i have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a price\r
+i tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's\r
i Brennan Center has estimated that replacing aging voting\r
i machines over the next few years could cost well over $1\r
i billion. The 156-page report [...] bemoans a rickety system\r
i compromised by insecure voting equipment and software whose\r
i vulnerabilities were exposed more than a decade ago and which\r
i are too often managed by officials with little training in\r
-i cybersecurity. Among its specific recommendations was a\r
-i mainstay of election reformers: All elections should use\r
-i human-readable paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are\r
-i intended to assure voters that their vote was recorded\r
-i accurately. They also create a lasting record of "voter\r
-i intent" that can be used for reliable recounts, which may not\r
-i be possible in systems that record votes electronically. [...]\r
-i The panel also calls for all states to adopt a type of\r
-i post-election audit that employs statistical analysis of\r
-i ballots prior to results certification. Such "risk-limiting"\r
-i audits are designed to uncover miscounts and vote tampering.\r
-i Currently only three states mandate them.\r
+i cybersecurity.\r
+i \r
+i >\r
+i \r
+i > Among its specific recommendations was a mainstay of\r
+i election reformers: All elections should use human-readable\r
+i paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are intended to assure\r
+i voters that their vote was recorded accurately. They also\r
+i create a lasting record of "voter intent" that can be used for\r
+i reliable recounts, which may not be possible in systems that\r
+i record votes electronically. [...] The panel also calls for\r
+i all states to adopt a type of post-election audit that employs\r
+i statistical analysis of ballots prior to results\r
+i certification. Such "risk-limiting" audits are designed to\r
+i uncover miscounts and vote tampering. Currently only three\r
+i states mandate them.\r
+i \r
+i \r
+i \r
+i [1] https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protec-\r
+i ting-american-democracy\r
+i \r
+i [2] https://www.nap.edu/read/25120/chapter/7#103\r
+i \r
+i [3] https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/09/06/technology/ap-\r
+i us-tec-election-security-reform-report.html\r
i\r
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