Merge branch 'master' of github.com:nikiroo/gofetch

[gofetch.git] / test / expected / SLASHDOT / 0102640864

diff --git a/test/expected/SLASHDOT/0102640864 b/test/expected/SLASHDOT/0102640864
index ef36c281938474edf303ae55c7e5821f721bdeef..5863002b7685c78c30b308c6e0ed3fe837b71110 100644 (file)
--- a/test/expected/SLASHDOT/0102640864
+++ b/test/expected/SLASHDOT/0102640864
@@ -4,54 +4,72 @@
   Thursday September 06, 2018 @11:30PM (BeauHD)\r
   from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept.\r
 \r
   Thursday September 06, 2018 @11:30PM (BeauHD)\r
   from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept.\r
 \r

+  o Reference: 0102640864\r

   o News link: https://politics.slashdot.org/story/18/09/06/2137245/blockchains-are-not-safe-for-voting-concludes-nap-report\r
   o Source link: https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/09/06/technology/ap-us-tec-election-security-reform-report.html\r
 \r
 \r
     The  National  Academies  Press has released a 156-page report,\r
   o News link: https://politics.slashdot.org/story/18/09/06/2137245/blockchains-are-not-safe-for-voting-concludes-nap-report\r
   o Source link: https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/09/06/technology/ap-us-tec-election-security-reform-report.html\r
 \r
 \r
     The  National  Academies  Press has released a 156-page report,\r

-    called  "Securing  the  Vote:  Protecting  American Democracy,"\r
-    concluding  that blockchains are not safe for the U.S. election\r
-    system.   "While  the  notion  of  using  a  blockchain  as  an\r
+    called  "  [1]Securing  the Vote: Protecting American Democracy\r
+    ,"  concluding  that  blockchains  are  not  safe  for the U.S.\r
+    election  system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an\r

     immutable  ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology\r
     does  little  to  solve  the  fundamental  security  issues  of\r
     elections,   and   indeed,   blockchains  introduce  additional\r
     immutable  ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology\r
     does  little  to  solve  the  fundamental  security  issues  of\r
     elections,   and   indeed,   blockchains  introduce  additional\r

-    security  vulnerabilities,"  the report states. "In particular,\r
-    if  malware  on  a  voter's device alters a vote before it ever\r
-    reaches  a blockchain, the immutability of the blockchain fails\r
-    to  provide the desired integrity, and the voter may never know\r
-    of   the   alteration."   The   report  goes  on  to  say  that\r
-    "Blockchains  do  not  provide  the anonymity often ascribed to\r
-    them."  It  continues: "In the particular context of elections,\r
-    voters  need  to  be  authorized as eligible to vote and as not\r
-    having  cast  more  than one ballot in the particular election.\r
-    Blockchains  do  not  offer  means  for providing the necessary\r
-    authorization.  [...]  If  a  blockchain  is  used,  then  cast\r
-    ballots  must  be  encrypted or otherwise anonymized to prevent\r
-    coercion  and  vote-selling." The New York Times summarizes the\r
-    findings:  The  cautiously  worded  report calls for conducting\r
-    all  federal,  state  and  local  elections on paper ballots by\r
-    2020.  Its  other  top  recommendation would require nationwide\r
-    use  of a specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure\r
-    votes  have  been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a\r
-    price  tag  for its recommended overhaul. New York University's\r
+    security   vulnerabilities,"   the   report   [2]states  .  "In\r
+    particular,  if  malware  on  a  voter's  device  alters a vote\r
+    before  it  ever  reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the\r
+    blockchain  fails  to  provide  the  desired integrity, and the\r
+    voter may never know of the alteration."\r
+    \r
+    The  report goes on to say that "Blockchains do not provide the\r
+    anonymity  often  ascribed  to  them."  It  continues:  "In the\r
+    particular  context  of elections, voters need to be authorized\r
+    as  eligible  to  vote  and  as  not  having cast more than one\r
+    ballot  in  the  particular  election. Blockchains do not offer\r
+    means  for  providing  the  necessary authorization. [...] If a\r
+    blockchain  is  used,  then  cast  ballots must be encrypted or\r
+    otherwise  anonymized  to  prevent  coercion and vote-selling."\r
+    The New York Times summarizes the findings:\r
+    \r
+    >  The  cautiously  worded  report  [3]calls for conducting all\r
+    federal,  state  and local elections on paper ballots by 2020 .\r
+    Its  other top recommendation would require nationwide use of a\r
+    specific  form  of  routine  postelection audit to ensure votes\r
+    have  been  accurately counted. The panel did not offer a price\r
+    tag   for  its  recommended  overhaul.  New  York  University's\r

     Brennan  Center  has  estimated  that  replacing  aging  voting\r
     machines  over  the  next  few  years  could  cost well over $1\r
     billion.  The  156-page  report  [...] bemoans a rickety system\r
     compromised  by  insecure  voting  equipment and software whose\r
     vulnerabilities  were  exposed more than a decade ago and which\r
     are  too  often  managed  by  officials with little training in\r
     Brennan  Center  has  estimated  that  replacing  aging  voting\r
     machines  over  the  next  few  years  could  cost well over $1\r
     billion.  The  156-page  report  [...] bemoans a rickety system\r
     compromised  by  insecure  voting  equipment and software whose\r
     vulnerabilities  were  exposed more than a decade ago and which\r
     are  too  often  managed  by  officials with little training in\r

-    cybersecurity.   Among   its  specific  recommendations  was  a\r
-    mainstay  of  election  reformers:  All  elections  should  use\r
-    human-readable   paper   ballots  by  2020.  Such  systems  are\r
-    intended   to  assure  voters  that  their  vote  was  recorded\r
-    accurately.  They  also  create  a  lasting  record  of  "voter\r
-    intent"  that  can be used for reliable recounts, which may not\r
-    be  possible in systems that record votes electronically. [...]\r
-    The  panel  also  calls  for  all  states  to  adopt  a type of\r
-    post-election   audit  that  employs  statistical  analysis  of\r
-    ballots  prior  to  results certification. Such "risk-limiting"\r
-    audits  are  designed  to uncover miscounts and vote tampering.\r
-    Currently only three states mandate them.\r
+    cybersecurity.\r
+    \r
+    >\r
+    \r
+    >   Among  its  specific  recommendations  was  a  mainstay  of\r
+    election  reformers:  All  elections  should use human-readable\r
+    paper  ballots  by  2020.  Such  systems are intended to assure\r
+    voters  that  their  vote  was  recorded  accurately. They also\r
+    create  a lasting record of "voter intent" that can be used for\r
+    reliable  recounts,  which  may not be possible in systems that\r
+    record  votes  electronically.  [...]  The panel also calls for\r
+    all  states to adopt a type of post-election audit that employs\r
+    statistical    analysis    of    ballots   prior   to   results\r
+    certification.  Such  "risk-limiting"  audits  are  designed to\r
+    uncover  miscounts  and  vote  tampering.  Currently only three\r
+    states mandate them.\r
+    \r
+    \r
+    \r
+    [1] https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protec-\r
+    ting-american-democracy\r
+    \r
+    [2] https://www.nap.edu/read/25120/chapter/7#103\r
+    \r
+    [3]  https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/09/06/technology/ap-\r
+    us-tec-election-security-reform-report.html\r

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