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299a08f3 NR |
1 | 0Blockchains Are Not Safe For Voting, Concludes NAP Report (nytimes.com) null/SLASHDOT/0102640864 70\r |
2 | i Thursday September 06, 2018 @11:30PM (BeauHD)\r | |
3 | i from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept.\r | |
4 | i\r | |
5 | i The National Academies Press has released a 156-page report,\r | |
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6 | i called " [1]Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy\r |
7 | i ," concluding that blockchains are not safe for the U.S.\r | |
8 | i election system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an\r | |
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9 | i immutable ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology\r |
10 | i does little to solve the fundamental security issues of\r | |
11 | i elections, and indeed, blockchains introduce additional\r | |
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12 | i security vulnerabilities," the report [2]states . "In\r |
13 | i particular, if malware on a voter's device alters a vote\r | |
14 | i before it ever reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the\r | |
15 | i blockchain fails to provide the desired integrity, and the\r | |
16 | i voter may never know of the alteration."\r | |
17 | i \r | |
18 | i The report goes on to say that "Blockchains do not provide the\r | |
19 | i anonymity often ascribed to them." It continues: "In the\r | |
20 | i particular context of elections, voters need to be authorized\r | |
21 | i as eligible to vote and as not having cast more than one\r | |
22 | i ballot in the particular election. Blockchains do not offer\r | |
23 | i means for providing the necessary authorization. [...] If a\r | |
24 | i blockchain is used, then cast ballots must be encrypted or\r | |
25 | i otherwise anonymized to prevent coercion and vote-selling."\r | |
26 | i The New York Times summarizes the findings:\r | |
27 | i \r | |
28 | i > The cautiously worded report [3]calls for conducting all\r | |
29 | i federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by 2020 .\r | |
30 | i Its other top recommendation would require nationwide use of a\r | |
31 | i specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure votes\r | |
32 | i have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a price\r | |
33 | i tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's\r | |
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34 | i Brennan Center has estimated that replacing aging voting\r |
35 | i machines over the next few years could cost well over $1\r | |
36 | i billion. The 156-page report [...] bemoans a rickety system\r | |
37 | i compromised by insecure voting equipment and software whose\r | |
38 | i vulnerabilities were exposed more than a decade ago and which\r | |
39 | i are too often managed by officials with little training in\r | |
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40 | i cybersecurity.\r |
41 | i \r | |
42 | i >\r | |
43 | i \r | |
44 | i > Among its specific recommendations was a mainstay of\r | |
45 | i election reformers: All elections should use human-readable\r | |
46 | i paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are intended to assure\r | |
47 | i voters that their vote was recorded accurately. They also\r | |
48 | i create a lasting record of "voter intent" that can be used for\r | |
49 | i reliable recounts, which may not be possible in systems that\r | |
50 | i record votes electronically. [...] The panel also calls for\r | |
51 | i all states to adopt a type of post-election audit that employs\r | |
52 | i statistical analysis of ballots prior to results\r | |
53 | i certification. Such "risk-limiting" audits are designed to\r | |
54 | i uncover miscounts and vote tampering. Currently only three\r | |
55 | i states mandate them.\r | |
56 | i \r | |
57 | i \r | |
58 | i \r | |
59 | i [1] https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protec-\r | |
60 | i ting-american-democracy\r | |
61 | i \r | |
62 | i [2] https://www.nap.edu/read/25120/chapter/7#103\r | |
63 | i \r | |
64 | i [3] https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/09/06/technology/ap-\r | |
65 | i us-tec-election-security-reform-report.html\r | |
299a08f3 | 66 | i\r |