1 BLOCKCHAINS ARE NOT SAFE FOR VOTING, CONCLUDES NAP REPORT
4 Thursday September 06, 2018 @11:30PM (BeauHD)
5 from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept.
7 o Reference: 0102640864
8 o News link: https://politics.slashdot.org/story/18/09/06/2137245/blockchains-are-not-safe-for-voting-concludes-nap-report
9 o Source link: https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/09/06/technology/ap-us-tec-election-security-reform-report.html
12 The National Academies Press has released a 156-page report,
13 called "Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy,"
14 concluding that blockchains are not safe for the U.S. election
15 system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an
16 immutable ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology
17 does little to solve the fundamental security issues of
18 elections, and indeed, blockchains introduce additional
19 security vulnerabilities," the report states. "In particular,
20 if malware on a voter's device alters a vote before it ever
21 reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the blockchain fails
22 to provide the desired integrity, and the voter may never know
23 of the alteration." The report goes on to say that
24 "Blockchains do not provide the anonymity often ascribed to
25 them." It continues: "In the particular context of elections,
26 voters need to be authorized as eligible to vote and as not
27 having cast more than one ballot in the particular election.
28 Blockchains do not offer means for providing the necessary
29 authorization. [...] If a blockchain is used, then cast
30 ballots must be encrypted or otherwise anonymized to prevent
31 coercion and vote-selling." The New York Times summarizes the
32 findings: The cautiously worded report calls for conducting
33 all federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by
34 2020. Its other top recommendation would require nationwide
35 use of a specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure
36 votes have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a
37 price tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's
38 Brennan Center has estimated that replacing aging voting
39 machines over the next few years could cost well over $1
40 billion. The 156-page report [...] bemoans a rickety system
41 compromised by insecure voting equipment and software whose
42 vulnerabilities were exposed more than a decade ago and which
43 are too often managed by officials with little training in
44 cybersecurity. Among its specific recommendations was a
45 mainstay of election reformers: All elections should use
46 human-readable paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are
47 intended to assure voters that their vote was recorded
48 accurately. They also create a lasting record of "voter
49 intent" that can be used for reliable recounts, which may not
50 be possible in systems that record votes electronically. [...]
51 The panel also calls for all states to adopt a type of
52 post-election audit that employs statistical analysis of
53 ballots prior to results certification. Such "risk-limiting"
54 audits are designed to uncover miscounts and vote tampering.
55 Currently only three states mandate them.
60 ** Re:All security = an implementation. (Score:5, Insightful)
61 (by PopeRatzo ( 965947 ))
64 > To say blockchain is inherently unsafe is like saying
65 > software is inherently unsafe
66 Oh, you are so close to a breakthrough.
67 When it comes to voting, blockchain, like software, IS
68 inherently unsafe. If the main goal for voting security is
69 maintaining the people's confidence in an election, the only
70 system that will meet that standard is a system where people
71 are actually keeping an eye on one another. And I mean
72 physically watching one another. And that's the system we had
73 in place before the advent of voting machines and election
74 software. You had a room full of election judges from both
75 sides, and they sat side-by-side checking in voters as they
76 approached the voting booth and physically watched them put
77 the ballot in the box. When the votes were counted, there was
78 a whole bunch of people from both parties standing around
79 keeping a close eye. When the ballots were sent for storage,
80 one person from each party rode in the truck to drop them off
81 after sealing the container - together - and signing off.
82 It was trust, but verify. Was it possible to jigger with an
83 election like that? Of course. But you had a list of names of
84 people you could hold accountable at every step in the
85 process. Electronic voting will never, ever be trusted. That
86 is the effect of transparency.
90 ** Re: (Score:1, Insightful)
94 > " If the main goal for voting security is maintaining
95 > the people's confidence in an election " - Well I don't
96 > agree with that starting point definition. I think
97 > security = security, not theater of.
98 Then you're bad at security. Security is theater.
99 There is no impregnable system. Security can only
100 increase the difficulty of entering a system, it cannot
101 stop a determined opponent. Is a CCTV system going to
102 stop someone from breaking into your store? No, but it
103 will make the person think twice about it, because they
104 are likely to be recorded, found, and caught. Is the
105 TSA likely to stop all bad guys from getting on planes?
106 No, but it alters how much they must prepare to get on
107 board the plane so hop
110 (by Ocker3 ( 1232550 ))
113 Sadly, the TSA haven't shown themselves to be any
114 good at their job, repeatedly. It's hard to get good
115 help when the work is shite, the 'customers' range
116 from sullen to hating you, and the pay is peanuts.
121 ** Transparency is the key (Score:1)
122 (by victor_alarcon ( 5520418 ))
125 I thought that was the main selling point. Yes, I'm sure
126 someone can come up with some anonymity scheme but
127 transparency should be top priority. Apologies if the
132 (by Anonymous Coward)
135 Paper votes aren't any better, just look at Russia's vote
136 stuffing. Literately. Someone comes up to the booth and
137 stuffs fake/coerced votes into the box.
138 Now the way most US, Canadian, and UK elections are run,
139 the paper vote is a two-step process.
140 A) You go to a scrutineer to check your name off a PAPER
141 list, they hand you a ballot with no identifying
143 B) You mark an X on the ballot, fold it in half or stick
144 it in a privacy envelope and then stick it in a cardboard
145 box with a hole on top.
149 (by PopeRatzo ( 965947 ))
152 > Paper votes aren't any better, just look at Russia's
153 > vote stuffing. Literately. Someone comes up to the
154 > booth and stuffs fake/coerced votes into the box.
155 That's right, because Russia doesn't have the same
156 safeguards built into their elections that we have. You
157 don't have election judges from both sides watching
158 every vote from the time it's cast to the time it's
159 counted to the time it's sent for storage. In the US,
160 there have to be two election judges on hand when
161 absentee ballots are opened.
167 (by Ocker3 ( 1232550 ))
170 I'd invite you to visit us in Australia, where we have the
171 Australian Electoral Commission (AEC), a non-partisan (not
172 bi-partisan) body of people who are collectively
173 considered the Platinum Standard of running elections
174 around the world. We actually send people to the USA to
175 train election staff. We don't have party reps in the
176 voting area until the polls close, then the parties can
177 send in scrutineers who check that the paper ballots are
178 being counted as per the regulations (when I did this I
182 (by PopeRatzo ( 965947 ))
185 > I'd invite you to visit us in Australia,
186 I've spent a fair amount of time in Australia. Yes,
187 I've heard you guys do a good job with elections, but
188 I'm not coming back until you get rid of those spiders
189 that jump up and bite you on the eye. Oh, and drop
190 bears and yowgwai. I don't need that kind of stress,
197 (by shellster_dude ( 1261444 ))
200 Blockchains are obviously a terrible solution to election
201 fraud. The only thing that prevents blockchain tampering is a
202 ton of neutral third party machines checking the transactions
203 (typically miners). We've already seen that this is a
204 non-trivial problem when there is plenty of incentive for
205 random people to fulfill that role (mining of crypto
206 currency). National elections have very little incentive for
207 people to invest thousands in hardware and electricity, and a
208 ton of incentive for nation states like
211 ** Oh the irony (Score:4, Insightful)
212 (by the_skywise ( 189793 ))
215 > All elections should use human-readable paper ballots by 2020.
216 > Such systems are intended to assure voters that their vote was
217 > recorded accurately. They also create a lasting record of "voter
218 > intent" that can be used for reliable recounts,
219 Now I agree with this and am happy to move back to paper ballots
220 - But the entire reason we moved away from paper ballots was
221 because of the 2000 elections where Florida used punch cards and
222 political officers kept trying to argue over "partial punches",
223 "dimpled chads" and "dangling chads" where they tried to
224 reassess what the voter's INTENT was.
225 And, of course, let's not forget magical disappearing and
226 appearing boxes of ballots.
227 Any system can be hacked but the electronic one is harder to
228 track hacking than the good ol' traditional methods with paper
232 (by Dare nMc ( 468959 ))
235 Their have been academic papers proposing electronic system
236 that would be safe, where you could verify that your vote was
237 counted (IE received at the server.)
238 In theory with open software, hardware, and multiple servers
239 (again all open source) we could have a very robust
240 electronic voting system. This would require a large project
241 likely done with universities, and it may even be similar to
242 some bitcoin concepts.
243 The technology side is very solvable, getting the project
244 started, past the politics, and accept
247 ** Key statement (Score:2, Insightful)
248 (by Anonymous Coward)
251 They key statement in the finding that most technology solutions
252 fail to solve is this:
253 "Such systems are intended to *assure* voters that their vote
254 was recorded accurately."
255 In the end, paper ballots may seem inefficient from a processing
256 perspective, but that inefficiency becomes inherently difficult
257 to tamper with and builds in systems for checks and recounts.
258 The argument here is that blockchain is vulnerable before the
259 data is stored in the blockchain, at the UI and the machine
260 level, and blockchain th
263 (by presidenteloco ( 659168 ))
266 Blanket arguments against computer algorithms for secure
267 voting (or secure anything) are illogical, emotional, and
269 People argue to the effect: Because many programs have been
270 found to have a security flaw in either A) the algorithm
271 mathematics and logical assumptions, or in B) the
272 implementation, therefore ALL programs must have some flaw in
273 A) or B) therefore there is no such thing is a secure
274 computer program. That is just bullshit. It's incorrect,
275 unsupported generalization from specific examples.
278 (by presidenteloco ( 659168 ))
281 Ok, there's a stupid bug in slashdot apparently, not
282 including my less-than sign.
284 What's up with that. Let me try again. Hmm. There was a
285 less-than in there just to the left of this sentence.
286 That's lame on slashdot software's part.
287 So you proved that ALL programs have bugs?
292 ** Paper ballots are by far the most secure solution (Score:4,
294 (by Seven Spirals ( 4924941 ))
297 Gimme a break. Use paper. Computers will be better tools for
298 tabulating and processing the votes after they are cast, but
299 it's tough to beat paper for a recount. Even paper has it's
300 flaws, but the hand waving crypto-bullshit is pathetic "Oh but
301 this counter signature will detect if the previous
302 initialization vector was properly zeroed inside of the S-Box"
303 *rolls eyes*. KISS baby. Things don't get more secure by making
304 them more complex and I can't think of any way to make something
305 more complex than to introduce computers. Computers are great at
306 some things, ideal for some tasks: not for voting. They suck at
309 ** paper ballots (Score:1)
310 (by Anonymous Coward)
313 The only way you can have some measure of accountability while
314 keeping votes anonymous.
316 ** Or, for heaven's sake, you can just use paper (Score:3)
317 (by mark-t ( 151149 ))
320 Make a simple mark on a paper ballot indicating your vote, fold
323 Now theoretically you could bribe people who do the counting,
324 but you'd have to bribe a *LOT* of people to make any kind of
325 difference because each individual ballot box with the folded
326 ballots contains but a tiny fraction of the number of votes, and
327 nobody ever counts the ballots from more than one or sometimes
330 ** the real story (Score:2)
331 (by slashmydots ( 2189826 ))
334 Blockchains are perfect, right? WRONG. And also right. They are
335 mathmatically flawless BUT if you outprocess the rest of the
336 network, you can finalize a block with whatever the hell you
337 want in it. You can form a block that says you own all bitcoins,
338 all transactions put them in your wallet, and you're also the
339 queen of England. The reason this "51% attack" doesn't happen it
340 because that amount of processing power doesn't exist. That many
341 ASICs don't exist on Earth. But let's set up a separate
345 (by Kaenneth ( 82978 ))
348 Even with a 51% attack, the Bitcoin blockchain is filled with
349 digital signatures; noone but your own nodes would accept the
350 blocks, and you would only be 'fooling' yourself.
351 Electronic voting could only work if every citizen had their
352 own private, secure, digital signature key. Which can't
353 happen in the US because poor people can't afford them, and a
354 certain party would never give anything for free, while the
355 other would protect the poor.
361 (by jwymanm ( 627857 ))
364 This was the dumbest comment in the article. Obviously
365 software methods exist to verify after the fact that what you
366 saved is what you expected.
369 ** It's not how the vote was recorded... (Score:2)
370 (by LynnwoodRooster ( 966895 ))
373 > The report goes on to say that "Blockchains do not provide the
374 > anonymity often ascribed to them." It continues: "In the
375 > particular context of elections, voters need to be authorized as
376 > eligible to vote and as not having cast more than one ballot in
377 > the particular election.
378 It's who casts the vote. Before we even worry about Blockchain,
379 we need to ensure people casting the ballots are legally
380 eligible to vote. Guaranteeing a vote was cast is no more
381 important than guaranteeing who cast the vote was eligible to
382 actually cast that vote.
384 ** Paper ballots (Score:2)
385 (by burtosis ( 1124179 ))
388 Let me start out saying 100% electronic voting is going to be a
389 disaster, triply so when done remotely and not at a secure
390 voting machine. But what most people don't realize is we
391 currently use unencrypted images of paper ballots in many states
392 as backups. These are very insecure. Why not use paper ballots
393 for the primary method, blockchain for the electronic backups?
394 This ultimately seems far more secure than what we are doing
395 now. We also could use open source machines and have audits at
git://git.nikiroo.be / gofetch.git / blob