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10Blockchains Are Not Safe For Voting, Concludes NAP Report (nytimes.com) null/SLASHDOT/0102640864 70\r
2i Thursday September 06, 2018 @11:30PM (BeauHD)\r
3i from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept.\r
4i\r
5i The National Academies Press has released a 156-page report,\r
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6i called " [1]Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy\r
7i ," concluding that blockchains are not safe for the U.S.\r
8i election system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an\r
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9i immutable ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology\r
10i does little to solve the fundamental security issues of\r
11i elections, and indeed, blockchains introduce additional\r
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12i security vulnerabilities," the report [2]states . "In\r
13i particular, if malware on a voter's device alters a vote\r
14i before it ever reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the\r
15i blockchain fails to provide the desired integrity, and the\r
16i voter may never know of the alteration."\r
17i \r
18i The report goes on to say that "Blockchains do not provide the\r
19i anonymity often ascribed to them." It continues: "In the\r
20i particular context of elections, voters need to be authorized\r
21i as eligible to vote and as not having cast more than one\r
22i ballot in the particular election. Blockchains do not offer\r
23i means for providing the necessary authorization. [...] If a\r
24i blockchain is used, then cast ballots must be encrypted or\r
25i otherwise anonymized to prevent coercion and vote-selling."\r
26i The New York Times summarizes the findings:\r
27i \r
28i > The cautiously worded report [3]calls for conducting all\r
29i federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by 2020 .\r
30i Its other top recommendation would require nationwide use of a\r
31i specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure votes\r
32i have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a price\r
33i tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's\r
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34i Brennan Center has estimated that replacing aging voting\r
35i machines over the next few years could cost well over $1\r
36i billion. The 156-page report [...] bemoans a rickety system\r
37i compromised by insecure voting equipment and software whose\r
38i vulnerabilities were exposed more than a decade ago and which\r
39i are too often managed by officials with little training in\r
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40i cybersecurity.\r
41i \r
42i >\r
43i \r
44i > Among its specific recommendations was a mainstay of\r
45i election reformers: All elections should use human-readable\r
46i paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are intended to assure\r
47i voters that their vote was recorded accurately. They also\r
48i create a lasting record of "voter intent" that can be used for\r
49i reliable recounts, which may not be possible in systems that\r
50i record votes electronically. [...] The panel also calls for\r
51i all states to adopt a type of post-election audit that employs\r
52i statistical analysis of ballots prior to results\r
53i certification. Such "risk-limiting" audits are designed to\r
54i uncover miscounts and vote tampering. Currently only three\r
55i states mandate them.\r
56i \r
57i \r
58i \r
59i [1] https://www.nap.edu/catalog/25120/securing-the-vote-protec-\r
60i ting-american-democracy\r
61i \r
62i [2] https://www.nap.edu/read/25120/chapter/7#103\r
63i \r
64i [3] https://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2018/09/06/technology/ap-\r
65i us-tec-election-security-reform-report.html\r
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