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1 0Blockchains Are Not Safe For Voting, Concludes NAP Report (nytimes.com) null/SLASHDOT/0102640864 70
2 i Thursday September 06, 2018 @11:30PM (BeauHD)
3 i from the ensuring-the-integrity-of-elections dept.
4 i
5 i The National Academies Press has released a 156-page report,
6 i called "Securing the Vote: Protecting American Democracy,"
7 i concluding that blockchains are not safe for the U.S. election
8 i system. "While the notion of using a blockchain as an
9 i immutable ballot box may seem promising, blockchain technology
10 i does little to solve the fundamental security issues of
11 i elections, and indeed, blockchains introduce additional
12 i security vulnerabilities," the report states. "In particular,
13 i if malware on a voter's device alters a vote before it ever
14 i reaches a blockchain, the immutability of the blockchain fails
15 i to provide the desired integrity, and the voter may never know
16 i of the alteration." The report goes on to say that
17 i "Blockchains do not provide the anonymity often ascribed to
18 i them." It continues: "In the particular context of elections,
19 i voters need to be authorized as eligible to vote and as not
20 i having cast more than one ballot in the particular election.
21 i Blockchains do not offer means for providing the necessary
22 i authorization. [...] If a blockchain is used, then cast
23 i ballots must be encrypted or otherwise anonymized to prevent
24 i coercion and vote-selling." The New York Times summarizes the
25 i findings: The cautiously worded report calls for conducting
26 i all federal, state and local elections on paper ballots by
27 i 2020. Its other top recommendation would require nationwide
28 i use of a specific form of routine postelection audit to ensure
29 i votes have been accurately counted. The panel did not offer a
30 i price tag for its recommended overhaul. New York University's
31 i Brennan Center has estimated that replacing aging voting
32 i machines over the next few years could cost well over $1
33 i billion. The 156-page report [...] bemoans a rickety system
34 i compromised by insecure voting equipment and software whose
35 i vulnerabilities were exposed more than a decade ago and which
36 i are too often managed by officials with little training in
37 i cybersecurity. Among its specific recommendations was a
38 i mainstay of election reformers: All elections should use
39 i human-readable paper ballots by 2020. Such systems are
40 i intended to assure voters that their vote was recorded
41 i accurately. They also create a lasting record of "voter
42 i intent" that can be used for reliable recounts, which may not
43 i be possible in systems that record votes electronically. [...]
44 i The panel also calls for all states to adopt a type of
45 i post-election audit that employs statistical analysis of
46 i ballots prior to results certification. Such "risk-limiting"
47 i audits are designed to uncover miscounts and vote tampering.
48 i Currently only three states mandate them.
49 i